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RECENT DECISIONS
Once one looks away from the physical point where the accident
occurs, and investigates the policy of both states' laws and the con-
tacts with the issues and the parties, one begins to doubt the basic
value of the ancient rule based upon the situs of the tort. Pennsyl-
vania with its weightier contacts and strong public policy towards
adequate relief should control, as against the prior lex loci delicti
rule, developed in an age when all the contacts developed in one state
consistently, which does not fit modern day circumstances.
JOHN W. MCGONIGLE
CONSTrrUTIONAL LAw-Reapportionment-The Pennsylvania Re-
apportionment Act held unconstitutional.
Butcher v. Bloom, 415 Pa. 438, 203 A. 2d 556 (1964)
The courts of this land until recently, were hesitant to decide state
legislature apportionment questions.1 This subject was generally
deemed political in nature, thus not properly one for judicial de-
termination. In 1962, however, the United States Supreme Court
said that dilution of citizens voting power caused by apportionment
not substantially based on population presented a justiciable con-
troversy for the federal courts.2 Since then the judicial tribunals
of the several states have been flooded with "apportionment" litiga-
tion-Pennsylvania has been no exception. In 1962 Pennsylvania
taxpayers filed complaints in the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin
County challenging the constitutionality of th legislative appor-
tionment law.3 The case was held over by the Common Pleas Court
and adjudication of the issues was deferred until the legislature had
a sufficient opportunity to enact new apportionment legislation at its
next session. Subsequently, two new apportionment bills were en-
acted 4 and signed into law. These two new apportionment laws
were challenged by the plaintiffs by petitioning the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania to take jurisdiction of the case. The court granted
the petition. Thus, the court was faced with a question involving
1. Cook v. Fortson, 329 U.S. 675 (1946); Radford v. Gary, 352 U.S. 991
(1957).
2. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
3. Butcher v. Trimarchi, 28 Pa. D. & C. 2d, 537 (1962). Act of May 10,
1921, P.L. 449, as amended, 25 P.S. §2201. Act of July 29, 1953, P.L. 956, 25 P.S.
§2215.
4. Act of January 9, 1964, P.L. 3, 25 P.S. §2221 (Supp. 1963). Act of
January 9. 1964, P.L. 4, 25 P.S. §2217 (Supp. 1963).
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the very essence of representative democracy, namely the rights of
the citizens of Pennsylvania in electing their legislature. "It pre-
sents one of the most important constitutional questions ever raised
in the history of this Commonwealth." 5
The court held that these 1964 acts were violative of the four-
teenth amendment of the Constitution. The court based its decision
upon the holdings of United States Supreme Court in the cases
originating with Baker v. Carr and evolving through Reynolds v.
Sims. 6 The court relied primarily upon the Reynolds case which
established the following rules: that both houses of a bicameral
legislature must be substantially based on population; 7 that dilut-
ing the weight of votes because of place of residence impairs basic
constitutional rights under the fourteenth amendment just as much
as invidious discrimination based upon factors such as race or
economic status;s that a state legislative districting scheme which
gives the same number of representatives to unequal number of con-
stituents cannot be constitutionally sustained; 9 that the requirement
of the fourteenth amendment is: "... . no less than substantially equal
state legislative representation for all citizens of all places."' 1 0
Pennsylvania's Reapportionment Acts do not meet the requirement
of the fourteenth amendment as announced by the United States
Supreme Court, and thus were declared invalid. The court's task
was fulfilled by the constitutional determination of the Reappor-
tionment Acts. It was required to do no more since the issues were
determined and the case disposed of by this ruling. It is a generally
accepted doctrine of constitutional law that constitutional questions
will not be decided unless their determination is essential to the dis-
position of the case.' 1 The disposition of this case was resolved by
the Pennsylvania court's decision on the validity of the statutes.
Further constitutional inquiry into matters not essential for and
merely collateral to the disposition, could have and should have
properly been restrained. However, the court felt inclined to gratui-
5. Butcher v. Bloom, 415 Pa. 438, 445 (1964).
6. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 84 S. Ct. 1362 (1964); WMCA, Inc. v.
Lomenzo, 377 U.S. 633 (1964); Maryland Committee for Fair Representation
v. Tawes, 377 U.S. 656 (1964); Davis v. Mann, 377 U.S. 678 (1964); Roman v.
Sincock, 377 U.S. 695 (1964); Lucas v. Forty-Fourth General Assembly of State
of Colorado, 377 U.S. 713 (1964).
7. Reynolds v. Sims, 84 S. Ct. 1362 (1964).
8. Supra note 7 at 1384.
9. Supra note 7 at 1382.
10. Supra note 7 at 1385.
11. Commonwealth, to use of Dollar Saving & Trust Co., Trustee v. Picard,
296 Pa. 120 (1929). Altieri v. Allentown Officers' and Employees' Retirement
Board, 368 Pa. 176 (1951).
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tously render a decision on the constitutionality of Article H1, sec-
tions 16 and 17 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. The court said:
In order to prevent undue confusion on the part of those
who are assigned the primary task of reapportionment, we
feel compelled to discuss several provisions of the Constitu-
tion of Pennsylvania. .. 12
Article II section 17 of the Pennsylvania Constitution provides:
The members of the House of Representatives shall be ap-
portioned among the several counties, on a ratio obtained
by dividing the population of the state as ascertained by the
most recent United States census by two hundred. Every
county containing less than five ratios shall have one repre-
sentative for each full ratio; and- an additional representa-
tive when the surplus exceeds a half ratio; but each county
shall have at least one representative. Every county con-
taining five ratios or more shall have one representative for
every full ratio. Every city containing a population equal
to a ratio shall elect separately its portion of the representa-
lives allotted to the county in which it is located. Every city
entitled to more than four representatives, and every county
having over one hundred thousand inhabitants shall be
divided into districts of compact and contiguous territory,
each district to elect its proportion of representatives ac-
cording to its population, but no district shall elect more
than four representatives.
The Court said:
Indeed § 17, when considered as a whole, demands that
boundaries of all political subdivisions be respected when
not -in conflict with the overriding population principle.
It must be interpreted to require that counties with small
populations, if necessary, be joined with other counties for
the purpose of electing and sharing a representative. We
hold that no provision of § 17 prohibits the division or
combination of counties in the formation of districts where
the population principle cannot otherwise be satisfied. 13
In this case the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania made two major
mistakes. As stated above, the constitutionality of the Pennsyl-
vania Constitution should not have been discussed. The controversy
of the case was already decided by ruling the Apportionment Acts
unconstitutional. Secondly, the court's interpretation of the words
12. Supra note 5 at 462.
13. Supra note 5 at 465.
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of the Pennsylvania Constitution was a complete disregard of the
true meaning of the English language. Article II section 16 of the
Pennsylvania Constitution provides:
The state shall be divided into fifty senatorial districts of
compact and contiguous territory as nearly equal in popula-
tion as may be, and each district shall be entitled to elect
one Senator. Each county containing one or more ratios of
population shall be entitled to one Senator for each ratio,
and to an additional Senator for a surplus population ex-
ceeding three-fifths of a ratio, but no county shall form a
separate district unless it shall contain four-fifths of a ratio,
except when the adjoining counties are each entitled to one
or more Senators, when such county may be assigned a
Senator on less than four-fifths and exceeding one-half of a
ratio; and no county shall be divided unless entitled to two
or more Senators. No city or county shall be entitled to sep-
arate representation exceeding one-sixth of the whole num-
ber of senators. No ward, borough, or township shall be
divided in the formation of a district. The senatorial ratio
shall be ascertained by dividing the whole population of the
State by the number of fifty.
The Court said:
We hold, therefore, that Article H § 16 of the Pennsylvania
Constitution requires that senatorial reapportionment legis-
lation must maintain the integrity of counties and other
political subdivisions, in so far as possible, and must provide
for compact districts of contiguous territory, subject always
to the overriding objective and mandate that such districts
shall be 'as nearly equal in population as may be'. We must
emphasize that, if necessary, any political subdivision or
subdivisions may be divided or combined in the formation
of districts where the population principle cannot otherwise
be satisfied. Furthermore, the number of senators per polit-
ical subdivision may not be limited if such limitation vio-
lates the equal-population principle. 14
The court's interpretation of section 17 is an unduly strained one.
This construction renders the phrase "but each county shall have one
representative" mere surplusage in the constitution. The court de-
clares that this does not mean that each county shall have at least
one exclusive representative; but rather a county may share a repre-
sentative with one or more other counties. If this is the actual inter-
14. Supra note 5 at 464.
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pretation, then the phrase is meaningless and useless in that without
it each county would have one representative in the sense the court
views it. The court is reading section 17 as if the phrase did not
appear therein. A common sense interpretation of this sentence
would produce the result that each county should have one repre-
sentative exclusively.
The court also failed to consider the probable discrimination re-
sulting from the ratio requirement promulgated in section 17. Here,
the constitution states that counties with five or more ratios get an
additional representative for an increase in population equal to one
full ratio, whereas counties with less than five ratios get an additional
representative for a population increase of one half ratio. This dis-
crimination is brought into focus by considering that a county with
4.5 ratios and a county with 5.99 ratios both have five representatives.
In their interpretation of section 16 the court exercised an obvious
disregard for the English language. The constitutional provision says
that "no city or county shall be entitled to separate representation
exceeding one-sixth of the whole number of Senators," without regard
to population. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court declared that it
means where population warrants more than one-sixth of the whole,
any city or county may so have representation exceeding one-sixth
of the whole. Further, the court calls attention to another of their
own faulty interpretations by declaring, "we must emphasize that, if
necessary, any political subdivision or subdivisions may be divided
or combined in the formation of districts . . ." The court says this in
face of the explicit statement in section 16 which states that, "no
ward, borough, or township shall be divided in the formation of a
district." This is not a case of interpretation or construction such as
where a court will construe the word "carriage" as appearing in a
traffic safety statute, to include automobiles and motorcycles. This
is a case where the court is completely disregarding the words of the
provision to the same extent as if in the above example the court
would say the word carriage means shoes. A court cannot under the
guise of construction impregnate words of the English language with
any meaning it chooses in absolute disregard for the words them-
selves.
The court, in reviewing the reapportionment acts, properly declared
them to be in violation of the fourteenth amendment of the federal
constitution. This ruling decided the issues and disposed of the case.
The court should have stopped here. On the contrary, the court felt
compelled to discuss the constitutionality of Article H sections 16
and 17 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. Assuming, arguendo, that
this consideration was justifiable under the circumstances, the court
19651
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did violence to the English language by attributing meanings to the
provisions in total disregard for the words of the provisions. It seems
that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was more interested in up-
holding traditional political science principles in regards to stable
constitutions, than in construing the constitution. Therefore, the
case was properly settled by the court in ruling the Reapportionment
Act of 1964 unconstitutional. The court should have gone no farther.
Consideration of the Pennsylvania Constitution was wholly unwar-
ranted in view of the well-established doctrine of avoiding constitu-
tional issues whenever possible. Furthermore, the court, after as-
suming this unnecessary task, came to an unreasonable conclusion.
If the court had to decide the validity of these sections of the Penn-
sylvania Constitution, it should have ruled them unconstitutional
under any reasonable interpretation of the English language.
ANDREW M. SCHIFINO
DENNIS GERARD LONG
CONFLICT OF LAws-Transfer under section 1404 (a) of Judicial Code,
a 1404 (a) transfer from one federal court in one jurisdiction to
federal court in another jurisdiction is a mere change of courtrooms,
with law to be applied by what the first federal court would apply.
Van Dusen v. Barrach, 376 U.S. 612 (1964).
The Supreme Court in the case of Van Dusen v. Barrach1 was pre-
sented with the problem of interpreting section 1404 (a) of the Judi-
cial Code. 2 The personal representatives of victims of a Massachu-
setts airplane crash instituted wrongful death actions in the Federal
Court in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The defendants moved
to transfer the action under section 1404 (a) to the Federal Court in
the District of Massachusetts. The Pennsylvania District Court
granted the motion, even though the personal representatives had
not qualified to sue in Massachusetts. This Court held that the
transfer was justified irrespective of which state's substantive and
conflict of law rules would control.3 Plaintiffs sought a writ of
1. 376 U.S. 612 (1964).
2. For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice,
a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division
where it might have been brought. 28 U.S.C. 1404(a).
3. Popkin v. Eastern Air Lines, 204 F. Supp. 426 (1962).
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